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INFRASTRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN 
Robert E. Looney• 
S ince the mid-1970s, energy planning in Pakistan has focused on (1) reducing the elasticity between economic growth and energy demand and 
(2) sharply increasing energy investment to augment domestic sources of supply. 
The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-1988) allocation for energy was 38 percent of 
total public-sector outlays. This represented a 200-percent increase over the 
achievements of the Fifth Plan. The Seventh Plan period (1988-1993) is contin-
uing this trend, with energy-sector investments accounting for nearly 50 percent 
of the public investment program in fiscal year (FY) 1989 and 45 percent in FY 
1990. 
Given the present and projected shortage of energy, the emphasis on shifting 
resources towards expanding supply is clearly justified.1 However, the large 
percentage of a small public investment program is both insufficient and unsus-
tainable because of conflicting demands from other sectors.2 In the short run, 
reducing the income elasticity of energy demand will be essential to reducing 
energy shortages. In this regard it is encouraging that other developing countries 
have been successful in loosening the link between growth and energy consump-
tion without harmful effects upon growth.3 
Because of its current budgetary constraints, the Pakistani government must 
make sure it is investing in the areas most productive in increasing the supply of 
energy. Qearly, increasing the supply of energy will involve not only investing 
directly in the energy sector, but also in a number of supportive infrastructural 
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undertakings. Given this necessity, the purpose of this paper is to determine 
which supporting areas may have inhibited development of the sector to date. 
Have deficient infrastructural facilities caused energy output to lag behind the 
needs created by the country's recent growth? If so, what types of infrastructure 
are in short supply? What are the implications for government policy? · 
Overview 
Pakistan possesses a variety of commercial and traditional energy resources for 
which there appears to be considerable scope for expansion. Much of the com-
mercially viable hydroelectric potential has not as yet been tapped, and the use of 
coal for possible thermal power generation has only just begun to be explored. 
Considerable reserves of natural gas have already been proven, and prospects are 
good for the discovery of additional fields of oil, and especially, of gas. 
Pakistan has made rapid strides in expanding its energy sector (table 1). For 
example, electricity output grew at a rate of 9. 7 percent per annum over the 1980-
1987 period. Crude oil production expanded even faster at 22.8 percent over the 
same interval. There have also been some marked shifts in the structure of the 
energy sector (table 2). It would be useful to survey the specific sources of 
energy.4 
Power: Pakistan has some 30,000 megawatts (MW) of hydropower potential of 
which only 2,897 MW have been developed and nearly 2,000 MW are under 
implementation. During the period 1984-1987, thermal power increased (table 3) 
by 15.8 percent, (up from 6.4 percent during the 1980-1984 period). The 
government's Long-Term Energy Strategy (LES) calls for the development of 
another 8, 700 MW by the year 2010. Two projects at Kalabagh and at Basha are 
to provide the bulk of the increase (6,000 MW). The delays so far in their 
launching and the as yet unresolved domestic and international issues regarding 
these two projects may cause a serious shortfall in future hydro supply. 
Shortages in hydropower generation have led to more rapid development of 
thermal generation capacity. The latter has lower investment costs and shorter 
gestation periods yet results in higher operational costs and increased pressure on 
the balance of payments, as, at the margin, fuel is imported. In FY 1988, thermal 
generation accounted for 57 percent of total power generation, but this is now 
expected to increase to 66 percent by. FY 1993. Almost half of thermal genera-
tion is oil based due to the failure to expand the use of domestic coal and gas for 
thermal generation. Pricing and political and technical issues have hampered 
private investment in both coal mining and coal-based power generation, while 
gas availabilities have remained below demand levels, with some consumers 
benefiting from subsidized prices well below those of comparable energy 
. --~ .. ··.-:; " 
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Table 1 
PAKISTAN: ENERGY COMMODITY BALANCE, 1973-1987 
Indicator 1973 1980 
Crude oil products 
(thousand barrels) 
Production 3,062 3,566 
Import 25,922 40,333 
Export 5,804 10,030 
Consumption 23,203 33,679 
Natural gas (million 
cubic meters) 
Production 4,052 7,354 
Import 0 0 
Export 0 0 
Consumption 4,052 7,354 
Coal (thousand tons) 
Production 1,192 1,569 
Import 31 98 
Export 0 0 
Consumption 1,333 1,668 
Electricity 
(gigawatt-hours) 
Generation 8,377 14,974 
Hydropower 4,335 8,714 
Nuclear 304 15oa 
Thermal 3,738 6,2.'>8 























1987 1980 1987 
12.0 2.2 22.8 
4.8 6.5 3.2 
-6.7 8.1 -19.4 
7.2 5.5 9.0 
7.7 8.9 6.5 
7.7 8.9 6.5 
4.7 4.0 5.4 
27.4 17.9 37.7 
6.4 3.3 9.7 
9.2 8.7 9.7 
9.4 10.5 8.3 
3.6 -8.5 22.3 
9.3 7.6 10.9 
9.2 8.7 9.7 
Source: Asian Development Banlc (ADB), Energy Planning Unit, Industry and Development 
Banks Deparbnent, Energy Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB (Manila: ADB, 
May 1989), p. 382. 
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Table 2 
PAKISfAN: SIRUcnJRE OF TIIE ENERGY SECTOR, 1973-1987 




Indicator 1973 1980 1987 1987 1980 1987 
Structure of primary 
energy consumption 100.0 100.0 100.0 ...: 
Oil 41.3 36.7 39.0 -0.4 -1.7 0.9 
Nonoil 58.7 63.3 61.0 0.3 1.0 -0.5 
Gas 37.1 41.0 35.8 -0.3 1.4 -1.9 
Coal 6.7 5.2 6.9 0.2 -3.6 4.1 
Primary electricity 14.9 17.1 18.2 1.4 2.0 0.9 
Hydro 13.9 17.1 17.6 1.7 3.0 0.4 
Nuclear 1.0 031 0.6 -3.6 -14.0 12.2 
Sectoral share of final energy 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Residential/commercial 11.2 15.7 19.2 3.9 4.9 2.9 
Oil 7.3 7.6 6.5 -0.8 0.6 -2.2 
Gas 2.0 4.9 7.8 l0.2 13.7 6.9 
Coal 0.2 0.1 0.0 -9.4 
Electricity 1.7 3.1 4.8 7.7 9.0 6.4 
Industry 39.7 35.7 34.3 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 
Oil 4.3 2.5 8.0 4.5 -7.5 18.1 
Gas 229 22.9 16.1 -2.5 0.0 -4.9 
Coal 7.9 6.4 5.6 -2.4 -3.0 -1.9 
Electricity 4.6 3.9 4.5 -0.2 -2.3 2.1 
Transport 21.3 25.9 26.3 1.5 2.8 0.2 
Agriculture 7.5 4.8 3.6 -5.1 -6.2 -4.0 
Others 12.5 8.4 3.0 -9.7 -5.5 -13.7 
Nonenergy 7.8 9.5 13.7 4.1 2.9 5.4 
11981. 
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB), Energy Planning Unit, Industry and Development 
Banks Department, Energy Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB (Manila: ADB, 
May 1989), p. 383. 
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Table 3 
PAKISTAN: INSTALLED GENERATING CAPACITY 




1973- 1973- 1980- 1984-
Indicator 1973 1980 1984 1987 1987 1980 1984 1987 
Thermal 1,068 1,814 2,325 3,615 9.1 7.9 6.4 15.8 
WAPDA1 654 1,141 1,442 2,477 10.0 21.0 6.0 19.8 
KESC:::I 673 883 1,138 7.0 8.8 
Hydropower 
(WAPDA)3 767 1,567 2,548 2,901 10.0 10.7 12.9 4.4 
Nuclear 
(KANUPP)1 137 137 137 137 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 1,972 3,518 5,010 6,654 9.1 8.6 9.2 9.9 
1WAPDA = Water and Power Authority; KESC = Karachi Electric Supply Corporation; 
KANUPP =Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. 
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB), Energy Planning Unit, Industry and Development 
Banks Department, Energy Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB (Manila: ADB, 
May 1989), p. 387. 
sources. In the coal sector, difficulties may continue as the financial and 
economic viability of the main coal deposits to be used for power generation 
have not yet proven sufficient to attract private investment. 
As far as electricity-generating infrastructure is concerned, one important area 
for efficiency enhancement concerns excessive losses in the transmission and 
distribution systems which, with few exceptions in the Asian countries, ranged 
from 13 percent to as high as 30 percent of power generated in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma, and Nepal. A large part of such 
losses are of a technical nature, although it is very difficult to establish appropri-
ate yardsticks and targets as system losses depend greatly on generation plant and 
fuel mixes, load factors, consumer and other demand characteristics, and other 
associated costs.5 • 
Oil: Pakistan's oil production-about 2.6 million metric tons (mt) of crude oil 
per year-is slightly over one-fourth of the country's total consumption of nearly 
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10 million mt. Refining capacity increased (table 4) by only 1.3 percent per 
annum over the 1980-1987 period (versus 7.6 percent per annum during 1973-
1980). Moreover, given the limited volume of proven reserves, reserves would 
be exhausted in five to seven years at the current rate of extraction. 
Thus, oil imports are likely to continue increasing and will put a serious burden 
on the balance of payments. In particular, if the share of electricity produced by 
other sources (hydro, gas, and coal) is not expanded, power supplies will 
continue to be in great shortage. At this time, oil products constitute the main 
source of thermal power generation and their share is expected to increase in the 
coming years.6 
While imported gasoline for the transport sector will be difficult to replace 
(except, on a limited basis, by natural gas), the massive use of oil products for 
power generation in a country with abundant hydro, gas, and coal resources is 
sub-optimal; in the short run, however, it is difficult to switch to hydropower 
generation because of long lead times and substantial capital costs of hydroelec-
tric investments. Given the continued high demand for oil products, additional 
and expanded exploration and development efforts, to be financed by private-
sector investment, should be encouraged. 
Gas: Prospects for the gas sector are brighter as proven reserves are large (16 
trillion cubic feet) and probable reserves (6.3 trillion cubic feet) are also signifi-
cant. As is the case of hydro re5ources, however, the rate at which these gas 
resources are developed is slower than the resource base warrants. This is due to 
the limited interest of the private oil industry in gas exploration; as a result, the 
government's efforts to attract private investment have' had only moderate 
success. Contributing factors are the limited capacity of government institutions 
charged with promoting private investment in the sector and the scarce resources 
for public investment. Even more importantly, gas use is constrained by the 
inadequacy of transmission infrastructure. 
Projects to upgrade and expand transmission infrastructure are being under-
taken, but this requires massive capital investment. As in the case of power, 
pricing is a major issue for the gas sector. In particular, energy prices have 
increased at rates considerably below the overall consumer or wholesale prices 
indices (table 5). Subsequently, gas prices for practically all consumers continue 
to be well below the equivalent international price for oil products, and in the 
case of gas used in the production of fertilizers, the price is even lower. 
Of the domestic production of natural gas, about 25 percent is consumed for 
fertilizer production, 36 percent for power generation, and the balance is used by 
households and commercial and industrial users. Natural gas generates only a 
third of total electricity in the country as some plants designed to operate as 
combined cycle facilities, but designed for optimum use of natural gas, are burn-
ing mostly oil because of the current unavailability of gas at their location. 7 
I 
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Table 4 
PAKISTAN: REFINING CAPACITY, 1973-1987 
(in thousand barrels per calendar day) 
Indicator 
Refinery capacity 
Crude distillation capacity 
Pakistan Refinery Ltd. 
National Refinery Ltd. 






































































































3 Petroleum domestic requirements include domestic consumption plus international bunkers; 
utilization rate is defined as the ratio of refinery throughput over crude distillation capacity; self-
reliance ratio is defined as the ratio of refinery output over domestic requirements. 
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB), Energy Planning Unit, Industry and Development 
Banks Department, Energy Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB (Manila: ADB, 
May 1989), p. 388. 
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Table 5 
PAKISTAN: ENERGY PRICE INDICES, 1973-1987 




Indicator 1973 1980 1987 1987 1980 1987 
General price indices 
Consumer prices 100.0 241.0 389.0 10.2 13.4 7.1 
Wholesale prices 100.0 218.0 354.0 9.4 11.8 7.2 
GDP deflator8 100.0 238.0 384.8 10.1 13.2 7.1 
Energy price indices based 
on original unit prices 
Oil products 100.0 507.0 631.0 14.1 26.1 3.2 
Motor spirit 100.0 324.0 520.0 12.5 18.3 7.0 
High octane 100.0 409.0 557.0 13.1 22.3 4.5 
Kerosine 100.0 568.0 682.0 14.7 28.2 2.6 
Diesel 100.0 424.0 583.0 13.4 22.9 4.7 
Fuel oil 100.0 521.0 825.0 16.3 26.6 6.8 
Natural gas 100.0 143.0 82.0 -1.4 5.2 -7.6 
Electricity 100.0 321.0 441.0 11.2 18.1 4.6 
Energy price indices based on 
tons of oil equivalent prices 
Oil products 100.0 476.0 629.0 14.0 25.0 4.1 
Natural gas 100.0 142.0 86.0 -1.1 5.1 -6.9 
Electricity 100.0 321.0 441.0 11.2 18.1 4.6 
Average energy 100.0 394.0 462.0 11.6 21.6 2.3 
aonp = gross domestic product. 
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB), Energy Planning Unit, Industry and Development 
Banks Department, Energy Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB (Manila: ADB, 
May 1989), p. 385. 
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Coal: Total recoverable reserves of coal are estimated at 1,400 million tons, of 
which 175 million tons are proven. Despite the technical sustainability of 
Pakistan's coal for the production of electricity and industrial steam, its share in 
the supply of commercial energy has remained stagnant at a very low level. This 
was mainly due to the pricing policy prior to 1985 when the price of fuel oil and 
natural gas was kept low. Although these prices were increased subsequently, 
development of coal deposits has not yet taken place. The main reasons for this 
delay include: (1) the absence of a stable market for large-scale use (a large coal-
fired thermal plant is now to be constructed but might end up using imported 
coal); (2) the inadequacy of laws governing coal exploration and development by 
the private sector; and (3) the failure of the public sector to develop publicly held 
concessions. 8 
The Seventh Five-Year Plan aims at taking bold measures to resolve issues 
which are an obstacle to the development of an adequate and viable national 
energy system. The major objectives of the plan are to (1) substantially increase 
electricity supply to sustain the projected growth in different sectors of the econ-
omy, eliminate load-shedding, and electrify most of the rural areas, (2) accelerate 
the exploration and development of domestic oil, coal, gas, hydroelectric, and 
renewable resources, (3) reduce the import burden by increasing the use of 
indigenous fuels like coal and gas in power generation and other sectors of the 
economy, (4) make conservation and efficient use of energy a common practice 
in all sectors and reduce power system losses, (5) establish an efficient load-
management system for optimum use of generated power to reduce the peak 
demand and to contribute towards minimizing load shedding, (6) draw upon the 
financial resources and expertise of the private sector to a much greater degree 
. for energy development and production, (7) rationalize energy consumer prices, 
remove structured anomalies, generate funds for new energy investments, 
provide incentives to conserve energy, and encourage desirable substitutions 
among different fuels, (8) strengthen the financial capacity of the government 
organizations to self-finance their investment programs and reduce the burden on 
government resources, (9) increase rural energy supplies, and (10) develop 
energy-sector manpower and improve the effectiveness of its institutions.9 
An important aspect of the Seventh Plan program will be the significant role 
played by the private sector: 
The contribution of the private sector in power system development is expected to be over 
2,000MW. This may include incentives such as designating areas for private sector power 
projects which have been identified, defining conditions of purchase of power by WAPDA 
and KESC, assigning a major portion of Lakhra coal fields for private power generation and 
designating selected dormant gas fields for private sector power development.lo 
Other than this statement, however, the plan is vague as to how the government 
intends to induce private-sector investment in the energy sector. 
·' 
276 TIIE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT 
Impact of Infrastructure 
Qearly, one way to stimulate private investment in energy is to make that 
investment more profitable. While the Seventh Five-Year Plan does not go into 
detail as to the effectiveness of infrastructure in contributing to an expansion of 
energy output, it is clear to most observers that infrastructural shortages are likely 
to have played a significant role in slowing down the development of the energy 
sector in recent years.11 
This analysis is usually based on impressionistic assessments. In addition, 
there is little or no information as to the relative productivity of different types of 
infrastructure in stimulating this sector's output. More importantly, qualitative 
assessments provide no insights as to the direction of causation-has infras-
tructural development stimulated increased levels of output by making energy 
sources more accessible? Or, ·instead, has infrastructure been a chronic bottle-
neck to output? That is, has the government responded with increased provision 
of infrastructure only after infrastructure deficiencies have severely constrained 
output and (presumably) the flow of private capital into the sector? 
A major issue in the analysis of the role of infrastructure in Pakistan's post-
1971 development therefore centers around the direction of causation: has infras-
tructure initiated growth in energy production or has it simply responded to the 
needs created by an expanding economy? 
Among economists there is a broad spectrum of viewpoints, some of them 
diametrically opposed to the other, concerning the role of infrastructure in the 
development process.12 There is consensus, however, as to the need for a· certain 
level of basic infrastructure facilities, since ultimately infrastructure must be a 
limiting factor without which no development process could take place even if 
other development processes were present. However, opinions as to 
infrastructure's precise role in the growth process beyond this point differ greatly. 
Some economists such as D.R. Glover and J. L. Simon13 and P. C. Frederik-
sen14 take the view that the role of infrastructure is simply to relieve "tensions" 
generated by supply and demand patterns as well as bottleneck pressures. 
Another (smaller) group of economists led by F. Voigh maintains that 
alternations in infrastructure exert a follow-on influence on investment and 
growth.15 
The majority of economists seem to take a middle position between these two 
more or less diametrically opposed views.16 Some of them consider infrastruc-
ture to be a function of the level of development; in other words, the. more 
economically and socially backward a potential development area, the stronger 
the impulses emanating from improvements in the stock of infrastructure. Others 
feel that the reciprocal relationship between changes in infrastructure and socio-
economic developments is such that the problem of cause and effect is not open 
to solution. 
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However, most economists agree that if infrastructure investments, labor 
market planning, and educational planning are uncoordinated, they are likely to 
yield conflicting results or, at any rate, outcomes that could eventually lead to 
undesirable solutions. Much of the confusion as to the role of infrastructure in 
energy development occurs because infrastructure itself is not homogeneous. In 
addition, it is quite likely that the contribution to output from infrastructure 
investment will be dependent on the stock of supporting factors, the composition 
md level of which are likely to vary somewhat over time. 
Complicating the issue is the fact that for many years economists were reluc-
:ant to discuss the issue of causality from a statistical perspective. However, 
·ecently several statistical tests are gaining wider acceptance in addressing issues 
>f this type. The original and most widely used causality test was developed by 
:.W.J. Granger.17 Applied to the situation at hand, infrastructure causes (in the 
:1ranger sense) growth in energy output, if that sector's growth can be predicted 
nore accurately by past values of infrastructure investment than by past values of 
ts output. To be certain that causality runs from infrastructure to output, past 
'lllues of infrastructure must also be more accurate than past values of output at 
redicting infrastructure expenditures.18 
More formally, four cases are possible. (a) Infrastructure causes output when 
ie prediction error for growth (of energy output) decreases when infrastructure 
1vestment is included in the energy growth equation. In addition, when energy 
rowth is added to the infrastructure equation, the final prediction error should 
tcrease. (b) Output causes infrastructure when the prediction error for energy 
11tput increases when infrastructure is added to the regression equation for 
itput and is reduced when output is added to the regression equation for infra-
ructure. (c) Feedback occurs when the final prediction error decreases when 
frastructure is added to the output equation, and the final prediction error 
~creases when energy output is added to the infrastructure equation. (d) No 
lationship exists when the final prediction error increases both when infra-
11cture is added to the energy output equation and when energy output is added 
the infrastructure equation. 
These patterns also imply something about the extent to which inadequate 
1cks of infrastructure may constrain output in the transportation/ 
mmunications sector. Extending the original ideas of A. 0. Hirschman, 
'rastructure development can initiate inputs used in production.19 This is the 
>eess referred to by Hirschman as "development via excess capacity" (of social 
erhead capital). Conversely, lagging infrastructure may increase costs of 
lducing and result in slowing output and investment In this situation the 
.horities are under pressure to expand infrastructure to "catch up" with the 
ck of directly productive capital. This route is often referred to as 
:velopment via shortage" (of social overhead capital).20 As Benjamin Higgins 
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Either method of unbalanced growth yields an "extra dividend" of "induced, easy-to-take or 
compelled decisions resulting in additional investment and output." Balanced growth (of 
social overhead capital and directly productive activity) is not only unattainable in most 
underdeveloped countries, it may not even be desirable. 1be rate of growth is likely to be 
faster with chronic imbalance, precisely because of the "incentives and pressures" it sets up.21 
From the above, it follows that at least four possible situations characterize the 
relationship between infrastructure investment and energy output iii Pakistan. 
1. Infrastructure Causes Output: This pattern is likely to reflect a situation 
where infrastructure is in excess (or non-constraining); the lower costs stemming 
from its provision result in follow-on investment and output. In this situation, 
infrastructure could be expected to have a high degree of linkage with productive 
factors and thus produce a strong output response. 
2. Growth Causes Infrastructure: Here infrastructure is lagging and responds to 
the needs created by previous growth. In this situation, infrastructure is likely to 
be a constraint on that output. This may have occurred in Pakistan, particularly 
during periods (such as the 1980s) when the economy expanded rapidly. 
Although infrastructure expanded during this period, it may still (given the needs) 
have been insufficient to produce a substantial stimulus to energy output. 
3. Feedback: Output and infrastructure become interdependent, perhaps 
reflecting a situation where infrastructure is likely a binding constraint on energy 
output. Once increased, infrastructure is adequate (relative to needs) to provide a 
positive stimulus to further output. 
4. No Relationship: As it implies, infrastructure is not a constraint on energy 
output, nor does it possess or create the type of linkages needed to induce 
increases in output or investment. 
The second and third patterns imply that some threshold level of infrastructure 
may be necessary before positive economic results can be obtained from 
expanding this type of capital. 
Operational Procedures 
The Pakistani Government does not publish data on the stock of and incre-
ments to the country's infrastructure. However, following the procedure of Mario 
Blejer and Mohsin Khan, it is possible to approximate increments to the nation's 
infrastructural base.22 The basic assumption underlying these proxies is that 
infrastructure investment is an ongoing process that moves slowly over time and 
cannot be changed very rapidly. 
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The first of the two approaches takes the trend level of real public-sector 
investment as representing the long-term or infrastructural component. In the 
discussion that follows, this measure is referred to as "estimated infrastructure." 
In computing this measure of infrastructure, we have used a linear trend. Devia-
tions of real public-sector investment from the trend are assumed to correspond to 
noninfrastructural investment. 
A second approach is to make the distinction between types of public invest-
ment on the basis of whether the investment is expected or not. Again, it is as-
sumed that expected, or anticipated, public investment is closer to the long-term 
or infrastructural component. If deterioration is occurring in the country's stock 
of infrastructure, this measure may be a more accurate proxy than that obtained 
using the trend method; it was the one used in the computations in this study. 
The data for investment upon which the infrastructure expenditures were 
calculated were derived from figures in two World Bank publications: Pakistan: 
Current Economic Situation and Prospect-Report No. 9283-PAK (March 22, 
1991) and Pakistan: Review of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983). Gross domestic 
product (GDP) and the GDP price deflator are from various issues of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics Yearbook. All vari-
ables were deflated by the GDP deflator and are in constant 1985 prices. For best 
statistical results, the variables were transformed into their logarithmic values.23 
A major conceptual problem in a study of this sort is that public infrastructure 
is usually not specifically directed toward one particular sector. Energy, for 
example, might be used by a number of sectors, some of which perhaps were not 
even considered in the original feasibility studies. Because of this element, a 
number of different measures of infrastructure (and investment) were used: (1) 
total public investment (and infrastructure); (2) energy; (3) public enterprises 
including railroads and post office/telephone/telegraph; and ( 4) general govern-
ment (including federal, provincial, and local governments). 
As purely a basis of comparison, several measures of private investment (total 
private and private in manufacturing) were also included in the study. 
Relationships between infrastructure expenditures and the economy were 
considered valid if they were statistically significant at the 95-percent level of 
confidence. That is, if 95 percent of the time we could conclude that they had not 
occurred by pure chance, we considered them statistically significant. 
There is no theoretical reason to believe that infrastructure and the economy 
have a set lag relationship-that is, they impact on one another over a fixed time 
period. The period could be rather short run, involving largely the spin-off from 
construction, or longer term as either term expands from the stimulus provided by 
the other. To find the optimal adjustment period of impact, lag structures of up to 
six years were estimated. The lag structure with the highest level of statistical 
significance was the one chosen best to.depict the relationship under considera-
tion (the optimal lag reported in tables 2, 3, and 4). 
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Results 
The analysis of total manufacturing produced several interesting patterns as 
seen in tables 6 and 7. 
1. The dominant pattern is one of feedback; that is, increases in infrastructure 
and investment tend to lead (usually) to an expansion in energy output. In turn, 
this expanded output induces further increases in investment and infrastructure. 
It should be noted, however, that except for direct investment in the energy 
sector, most of these effects were rather weak. 
2. As might be anticipated, increases in public infrastructure in the electricity, 
gas, and water sector produced a strong follow-on expansion of energy produc-
tion. However, it should be noted that public investment in the sector produced 
only a weak expansion in output. 
3. Expansion in public enterprise (including post office, telephone, and tele-
graph, together with the railroads) infrastructure is one exception to the general 
rule noted above. However, while public enterprise infrastructure produced a 
moderate increase in power output, investment by these enterprises only weakly 
stimulated increased energy production. 
4. Infrastructure expansion by semi-public organizations (including the energy 
sector) also produced a fairly strong increase in energy production (although 
investment by these enterprises was not nearly as effective in this regard). 
5. Indus Basin investment and infrastructure expansion-an area where one 
might expect a number of complementary relationships with energy develop-
ment-was actually associated with a decrease in energy production. 
6. General government infrastructure and investment (including that by federal, 
provincial, and local authorities) was only weakly associated with energy 
production. 
7. However, federal infrastructure responded fairly strongly to increased levels 
of energy production; that is, investment by federal authorities did not expand 
energy output. Instead, capital formation by this level of government responded 
to past increases in energy production. 
The general prevalence of feedback relationships suggests that infrastructure 
development may have lagged somewhat behind the needs created by econ-
omy-at least it is clear that infrastructure and public investment have not initi-
ated an expansion of the energy sector. At best, public investment and infras-
tructure have expanded, but usually only after induced by increased levels of 
energy production (and presumably the pressures that have been associated with 
. power shortages, load shedding, etc.). 
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Table 6 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 
INFRASTRUCTIJRE, AND TIIB ENERGY SECTOR, 1972-19903 
Optimal Lag (Years) Causation Patterns Dominant 
Final Prediction Error ( ) A B c D Pattern 
Electricity, gas, and water output 
Total public 3 4 2 4 Feedback 
investment (0.12E-1) (0.84E-2) (0.82E-2) (0.63E-2) (+w,-w) 
Total public 3 4 2 1 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.12E-l) (O.llE-1 (0.67E-2) (0.64E-2) (+w, +w) 
Public investment 3 4 4 4 Feedback 
electricity and gas (0.12E-l) (0.78E-2) (0.89E-1) (0.23E-1) (+w, +w) 
Public infrastructure 3 4 4 4 Infrastructure 
electricity and gas (0.12E-1) (0.12E-2) (O.SlE-1) (0.82E-1) -+Output (+vs) 
Public enterprises 3 4 4 4 Feedback 
investment (0.12E-1) (0.48E-2) (0.39E-1) (0.20E-1) (+w, +w) 
Public enterprises 3 3 1 3 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.12E-1 (0.44E-2) (0.25E-1) (0.14E-1) (+m, +w) 
Semi-public organ- 3 1 2 4 Investment 
ization investment (0.12E-1) (0.82E-2) (0.17E-1) (0.17E-1) -+Output ( +w) 
Semi-public 
organization 3 4 1 1 Infrastructure 
infrastructure (0.12E-1) (0.34E-2) (0.15E-1) (0.16E-1) -+Output ( +s) 
Post office, telegraph 3 2 1 3 Feedback 
investment (0.12E-1) (O.SOE-2) (0.84E-1) (0.44E-1) (+w, +m) 
Post office, telegraph 3 1 1 4 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.12E-1) (0.73E-2) (0.67E-1) (0.20E-1) (+w, +vw) 
Indus Basin 3 2 1 3 Feedback 
investment (0.12E-1) (059E-2) (0.22E-O) (0.19E-O) (-w,-w 
Indus Basin 3 1 1 4 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.12E-l) (0.56E-2) (0.12E-O) (0.88E-1) (-m,-w) 
3Summary of results obtained from Granger causality tests. A Hsiao procedure was incorporated 
to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in logarithmic form. Regression patterns: A= 
output on output; B = investment on output; C = investment on investment; D = output on invest-
ment. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs ( +,-)represent 
the direction of impact. In the case of feedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction 
error of relationshi~ Band D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-year lags. 
Strength assessment (s = strong; m = moderate; w = weak) based on the size of the standardized 
regression coefficient and t-test of statistical significance. 
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Table 7 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
INVES1MENT, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND Tiffi ENERGY SECTOR, 1972-199()1 
Optimal Lag (Years) Causation Patterns Dominant 
Final Prediction Error ( ) A B c D Pattern 
Electricity, Gas, and Water Output 
General government 3 2 1 1 Feedback 
investment (0.12E-1) (0.97E-2) (O.lOE-2) (0.65E-2) (+w, +m) 
General government 3 4 1 1 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.12E-1) (0.61E-2) (0.77E-2) (0.61E-2) (+w, +w) 
Federal government 3 2 1 1 Output 
investment (0.12E-1) (0.13E-1) (0.19E-1) (0.14E-1) -.Investment( +m) 
Federal government 3 4 1 2 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.12E-1) (0.85E-2) (0.13E-1) (O.lOE-1) (+w, +vw) 
Provincial government 3 3 2 3 Feedback 
investment (0.12E-1) (0.85E-2) (0.13E-1) (0.67E-2) (+w, +w) 
Provincial government 3 4 2 4 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.12E-1) (0.63E-2) (0.96E-2) (0.74E-2) (+w, +vw) 
Local government 3 1 1 1 Feedback 
investment (0.12E-1) (0.92E-2) (0.33E-1) (0.20E-2) (-w, +m) 
Local government 3 3 1 2 Feedback 
infrastructure (0.12E-1) (0.98E-2) (0.37E-2) (0.25E-1) (+vw, +vw) 
•summary of results obtained from Granger causality tests. A Hsiao procedure was incorporated 
to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in logarithmic form. Regression Patterns: A= 
output on output; B =investment on output; C =investment on investment; D =output on invest-
ment. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs (+,-)represent 
-the direction of impact. In the case of feedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction 
error of relationships Band D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-year lags. 
Strength assessment (s = strong; m =moderate; w =weak) based on the size of the standardized 
regression coefficient and t-test of statistical significance. 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN 283 
This is consistent with the finding by T. Riaz that 
... at an early stage of economic development each country relies heavily on non-commercial 
sources of energy and that the subsequent process of industrialization is highly energy-
intensive. In statistical terms, one would expect a negative intercept and a positive slope (of a 
regression of energy use and Gross National Product) for a developing country like Pakistan, 
whereas a developed country would be expected to have a positive intercept and positive slope 
which is fairly shallow as it must use large amounts of commercial energy to sustain 
itself-but because of the economic infrastructure, it can use its energy more efficiently.24 
Conclusions 
The above assessment of the interrelationship between public investment and 
energy development suggests serious output constraints, largely related to insuf-
ficient development of domestic resources. This, in tum, is related to low levels 
of investment which have been financed, nearly exclusively, by the federal 
government. In fact, energy-sector investments (mostly W APO A-Water and 
Power Development Authority) accounted for nearly 50 percent of the public 
investment program in FY 1989 and 45 percent in FY 1990. 
The large percentage of a small public investment program is both insufficient 
and unsustainable because of conflicting demands from other sectors. Therefore, 
in addition to higher domestic resource mobilization by the public sector (and by 
the energy-sector companies), increased private-sector investment in energy is 
essential.25 If the private sector is not responsive, the government will have to 
rely more and more on demand-side energy policies as a means of equilibrating 
the power markets. 
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